Search results for "Cournot equilibrium"

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Stackelberg equilibrium with many leaders and followers. The case of zero fixed costs

2017

Abstract I study a version of the Stackelberg game with many identical firms in which leaders and followers use a continuous cost function with no fixed cost. Using lattice theoretical methods I provide a set of conditions that guarantee that the game has an equilibrium in pure strategies. With convex costs the model shows the same properties as a quasi-competitive Cournot model. The same happens with concave costs, but only when the number of followers is small. When this number is large the leaders preempt entry. I study the comparative statics and the limit behavior of the equilibrium and I show how the main determinants of market structure interact. More competition between the leaders …

Stackelberg equilibriumEconomics and EconometricsComparative staticsSupermodular gameEndogenous market structures05 social sciencesExistence of the equilibriumCournot competitionEntry preemptionSettore SECS-P/06 - Economia ApplicataCournot equilibriumMicroeconomicsMarket structure0502 economics and businessTheoretical methodsStackelberg competitionEconomics050207 economicsSettore SECS-P/01 - Economia PoliticaConvex functionFixed costMathematical economics050205 econometrics Research in Economics
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